Without the complex military machine that his forebears had built up over the course of the eighth century, it would have been impossible for Charlemagne to revive the Roman empire in the West. Early Carolingian Warfare is the first book-length study of how the Frankish dynasty, beginning with Pippin II, established its power and cultivated its military expertise in order to reestablish the regnum Francorum , a geographical area of the late Roman period that includes much of present-day France and western Germany. Bernard Bachrach has thoroughly examined contemporary sources, including court chronicles, military handbooks, and late Roman histories and manuals, to establish how the early Carolingians used their legacy of political and military techniques and strategies forged in imperial Rome to regain control in the West. Pippin II and his successors were not diverted by opportunities for financial enrichment in the short term through raids and campaigns outside of the regnum Francorum; they focused on conquest with sagacious sensibilities, preferring bloodless diplomatic solutions to unnecessarily destructive warfare, and disdained military glory for its own sake. But when they had to deploy their military forces, their operations were brutal and efficient. Their training was exceptionally well developed, and their techniques included hand-to-hand combat, regimented troop movements, fighting on horseback with specialized mounted soldiers, and the execution of lengthy sieges employing artillery. In order to sustain their long-term strategy, the early Carolingians relied on a late Roman model whereby soldiers were recruited from among the militarized population who were required by law to serve outside their immediate communities. The ability to mass and train large armies from among farmers and urban-dwellers gave the Carolingians the necessary power to lay siege to the old Roman fortress cities that dominated the military topography of the West. Bachrach includes fresh accounts of Charles Martel's defeat of the Muslims at Poitiers in 732, and Pippin's successful siege of Bourges in 762, demonstrating that in the matter of warfare there never was a western European Dark Age that ultimately was enlightened by some later Renaissance. The early Carolingians built upon surviving military institutions, adopted late antique technology, and effectively utilized their classical intellectual inheritance to prepare the way militarily for Charlemagne's empire.

Throughout the history of Western civilization, war, preparation for war, and its aftermath have dominated the use of surplus human and material resources. Yet, despite our recent history, the brute facts of military history are too often ignored by those who have instead sought to provide a more ideal understanding of the Middle Ages in Europe. This predilection for chivalry at the expense of logistics and for "just war theory" at the expense of military technology have distorted both scholarly and popular understanding of the role played by military matters in the Middle Ages. The aim of the fourteen articles reprinted here is to help provide a more balanced view, offsetting notions of romanticism and an anthropologically inspired primitivism of a Dark Age in pre-Crusade Europe. Particular topics include: the survival of Classical influences into the early Middle Ages; the strategy of castle-building in the early Angevin domains; and William the Conqueror's preparations for the invasion of England.

This is the first comprehensive biography of Fulk Nerra, an important medieval ruler, who came to power in his teens and rose to be master in the west of the French Kingdom. Descendant of warriors and administrators who served the French kings, Fulk in turn built the state that provided a foundation for the vast Angevin empire later constructed by his descendants. Bernard Bachrach finds the terms "constructed" and "built" more than metaphorical in relation to Fulk's career. He shows how Fulk and the Angevin counts who followed him based their long-term state building policy on Roman strategies and fortifications described by Vegetius. This creative adaptation of Roman ideas and tactics, according to Bachrach, was the key to Fulk's successful consolidation of political power. Students of medieval and military history will find here a colorful, impressively researched biography. This is the first comprehensive biography of Fulk Nerra, an important medieval ruler, who came to power in his teens and rose to be master in the west of the French Kingdom. Descendant of warriors and administrators who served the French kings, Fulk in turn built the state that provided a foundation for the vast Angevin empire later constructed by his descendants. Bernard Bachrach finds the terms "constructed" and "built" more than metaphorical in relation to Fulk's career. He shows how Fulk and the Angevin counts who followed him based their long-term state building policy on Roman strategies and fortifications described by Vegetius. This creative adaptation of Roman ideas and tactics, according to Bachrach, was the key to Fulk's successful consolidation of political power. Students of medieval and military history will find here a colorful, impressively researched biography.

Contains documents and excerpts from documents of the 4th-9th centuries concerning Jewish-Christian relationships in Europe of the end of the Western Roman Empire and the barbarian kingdoms established in its territory. Pp. 15-43 contain excerpts from law codes, including Roman, Germanic, and canon law. Most of the laws concerning Jews were intended to prevent them from exercising power over Christians, especially over Christian slaves. There were also laws aiming to create unbearable conditions for Jews (and thus to force them to convert "voluntarily") or to humiliate them. The rest of the book relates to papal and royal policies toward Jews, as well as actual Jewish-Christian relationships, which were not always regulated by the laws. Sometimes, however, these relations included conflicts and violence against Jews.

The 12 articles reprinted here represent key studies in the process by which the "stirpes Tortulfi" created a great dynasty and built a successful state in Francia Occidentalis. The early history of the Agenvin dynasty building is lightly sketched, while showing how a family passes first into the aristocracy and then into the nobility. Studies 3 to 11 cover the process of state-building; studies 9 and 11 cover economic matters; and diplomatic, military, religious and intellectual techniques are explored in studies 5, 7, 9 and 10.

In these articles Professor Bachrach starts by looking at aspects of the ’barbarian’ occupation of the land of the Roman Empire, from Britain to the Alan settlements in southern Gaul. His particular interest, however, is in the political and, above all, in the military structures that grew out of the Early Middle Ages. He has sought to demonstrate that there was a fundamental continuity in military organisation and tactics from the Merovingian through the Carolingian period. As he shows, there is no reason to connect the origins of ’feudalism’ with Charles Martel’s wish to create a force of cavalry, and it is a fallacy that he grasped the potential of the stirrup for enabling mounted shock combat. On the contrary, its use in the West progressed only slowly, and it had nothing to do with the origins or growth of feudalism. Le professeur Bachrach débute par l’analyse de certains aspects de l’occupation barbare des terres de l’empire romain, de la Grande-Bretagne aux campements alans en Gaule méridionale. Il s’attache en suite aux structures politiques et, surtout, militaires qui furent issues du Haut Moyen Age. Selon lui, et il tente d’en faire ici la démonstration, l’organisation et les tactiques militaires ont fait preuve d’une continuité fondamentale de l’époque mérovingienne à celle des Carolingiens. Comme il le demontre, il n’y a pas lieu d’établir de liens entre l’origine du féodalisme et le désir qu’avait Charles Martel de créer une cavalerie; il est également tout à fait erroné de dire que ce dernier s’était rendu compte du potentiel de l’étrier en tant que facteur de mener des combats à cheval de choc. Bien contraire, l’utilisation de l’étrier à l’Ouest ne fit que progresser lentement et aucun rapport n’existe entre cet instrument et l’origine ou la croissance de la féodalité.

In the late sixth century Gundovald, a Frank of royal blood, returned from a lengthy exile in Italy and Constantinople to establish a regnum in the southwestern part of Gaul. His half brother, Guntram, who ruled the neighboring Burgundian region, vigorously opposed this intrusion. In this fascinating narrative, Bernard Bachrach provides a comprehensive reinterpretation of the dramatic attempt by Gundovald to succeed to the Merovingian throne with the help of the Byzantine Empire. Gundovald, a Merovingian prince, was rejected by his father, King Chlotar I, and declared not to be of royal blood. His association with the Byzantine Empire led Guntram to regard him as an "imperial puppet." In addition to examining the highly controversial diplomatic machinations behind Gundovald's bid for power, Bachrach breaks new ground with a thorough assessment of the strategy, tactics, and military technology of the "little war" fought between Gundovald's supporters and the armies of King Guntram. This conflict ended with the siege of the old Roman fortress city of Convenae in the foothills of the Pyrenees.