“A brilliant history of our least-known wars on our most-ignored frontier—our northern border with Canada” ( Los Angeles Times ). R edirecting our attention from the Civil War to the real conflict that consolidated the United States, Cohen describes how five groups— the British, French, Americans, Canadians, and Indians—fought over the key to the North American continent: the corridor running from Albany to Montreal, known to Native Americans as the “Great Warpath.” He explores how a distinctly American approach to war developed along these 200 miles, reintroducing characters we thought we knew—an admirable Benedict Arnold, a traitorous Ethan Allen, and a devious George Washington. A gripping read grounded in serious scholarship, Conquered into Liberty will enchant readers for decades to come.

In the span of a generation, universal military service, universal military training, selective service, a lottery draft, and an all-volunteer armed force have all been either implemented or contemplated seriously in the United States. Why has the United States, unlike every other twentieth-century world power, failed to settle on a durable system of military service? In this informed and even-handed book, Eliot Cohen studies the enduring problems of America's methods of raising an army, seeking to analyze the nature of the many difficulties and the extent to which they can be overcome. A nation's military service must reflect its political and geographical position in the world as well as its ideology. In the case of the United States, Cohen demonstrates, the attempt to satisfy these two types of requirements faces unique and intractable paradoxes. First, the United States must prepare for two completely different kinds of war, large- and small-scale, which for political and military reasons require two different kinds of armies; second, two important traditions?Anglo-Saxon liberalism and democratic egalitarianism?coexist uneasily in American thought and lead to opposing conceptions of citizens' obligations to serve their country. Cohen's book is a long-needed antidote to the myopic preoccupation with short-term trends and fluctuations in recruiting statistics that characterizes the current manpower debate. Lucidly explaining complex issues, Cohen offers a broad comparative view of the historical events, political exigencies, and theoretical arguments that have shaped the military service systems of various countries. His discussion treats many important and timely issues: How shall we select some men?and possibly women?for service, and not others? How will our methods of recruitment affect our foreign policies, our domestic policies, and our forces' performance in battle? What methods have other countries adopted, how well did they work, and could they work here? His thoughtful and objective answers to these difficult questions will interest anyone concerned with contemporary American military policy today.

More than any other episode since the end of the Cold War, the conflict in Kosovo revealed the distinctive attributes of a new American "way of war." In so doing, Kosovo also brought into sharp focus the military, political, and moral dilemmas confronting a liberal democracy intent on wielding preeminent power on a global scale. What are the moral implications posed by waging high-tech warfare for humanitarian purposes? Does the precedent set by intervention of this type point toward peace and stability or toward more war? How well suited are the United States military and American society as a whole to the security challenges of the age of globalization? According to Bacevich and Cohen, gauging the "success" achieved in Kosovo yields important answers to these and related questions. The volume includes a well-crafted historical overview of the war and six essays that place it in a broader context. The contributors explore the conflict's relationship to U.S. grand strategy, the Revolution in Military Affairs, and American civil-military relations, among other topics. Contributors: William A. Arkin, Andrew J. Bacevich, Eliot A. Cohen, Alberto R. Coll, James Kurth, Anatol Lieven, Michael Vickers

From 16 Jan. through 28 Feb. 1991, the U.S. & its allies conducted one of the most operationally successful wars in history, a conflict in which air operations played a preeminent role. This report captures the key findings of the 10 reports of the Survey. It proves an executive summary of each report & asks questions that cut across each of the reports: what was the air campaign plan, & what did it accomplish? what was the role of intelligence? who ran the air war? what were the conditions in the theater? what were the instruments of air power? what supported the air power? which technologies worked? Photos.