While today the Nazi genocide of Jews is seen as a massacre unique in its savagery and a central feature of World War II, in 1933-45 it was accepted in the USA, and in the Western world in general, as one of the many wartime brutalities, almost understandable and predictable. Political leaders, public opinion, and later the Allied military greeted the first news concerning the Nazi persecution and murder of Jews with disbelief; later, when the facts of the Nazi mass murder of Jews became apparent, they tended to conflate the Nazi victimization of Jews with that of other ethnic groups. There was a tendency to diminish the scope of the genocide and even to see it as, at least partly, deserved by the victims. These views found expression in a commonly shared reluctance to receive Jewish refugees from Nazism. Opinion polls of the late 1930s-early 1940s show that the American public was consistently against any relaxation of immigration restrictions. In Western Europe and the rest of the Americas, sentiments were similar: some countries were ready to admit Poles, Czechs, and other refugees, but not Jews. These sentiments can only partly be ascribed to the economic hardships of the 1930s; their main cause was antisemitism, ethnic opposition to the Jewish alien. In the postwar years, the tendency to silence and trivialize the Holocaust persevered; it was only in the 1960s that public opinion recognized the Holocaust as unique. Argues against Peter Novick's view, according to which Holocaust memory initially fell victim to the Cold War. Contends that, in the 1960s, most people thought that the "Jewish question" was finally solved - by emancipation, assimilation and, last but not least, by the Nazi mass murder.

The failed attempt on Hitler's life in July 1944 was the work of members of Germany's conservative elite, who sought to save their country from the disaster brought about by Hitler and the Nazis. Examines the ideals and motives of German resisters, many of whom were army officers, upper-level civil servants, or religious leaders. Ch. 4 (pp. 65-79), "That Perennial 'Jewish Question', " contends that most of the resisters supported racial antisemitism and believed that it was necessary to reduce Jewish influence in Germany. The most vocal antisemites among them were the Protestant clergy, and especially Otto Dibelius. The Catholic clergy were less hostile toward Jews, since they also suffered from discrimination, but they would not support the Jews for fear of endangering the Catholic community. Dietrich Bonhoeffer was the only resister who condemned Nazi antisemitism, but even he felt that there was a need to solve the "Jewish question." Most of the resisters were repelled by the Nazis' brutal treatment of the Jews, but their primary concern was for the future of Germany.