The Cuban Revolution of 1959 was a benchmark of triumph and a harbinger of tragedy to come. Rather than herald a new era of Cuba joining the world community of nations as a paragon of democracy as many fervently hoped and believed it would, it became instead a new stage in authoritarian rule in the Western hemisphere. For more than a half century since then Cuba has been defined by the capacity of a single family to command and determine the fate of a nation--and to do so with a minimum of opposition. Incredibly, even those professing adhesion to democratic norms have been ready to forgive the dictator his excesses. This volume explains the theory and practice of this absence of internal opposition and the persistence of external support for the Castro family and its entourage. "The Long Night of Dark Intent" is chronological in order, with the author indicating major points in each of the five decades covered. The volume covers five centers of system analysis: economics, politics, society, military, and ideology. Who or what "determines" events and decisions is the stuff of real history. It is precisely due to variability in causal chains in society that we have huge variance in levels of predictability. The course of the Cuban Revolution gives strong support for such an approach to the Castro Era. This is a unique, unflinching account with a strong emphasis on the importance of U.S. policy decisions over time.

War gaming has become a characteristic feature of modern life. From amateur clubs to professional academicians playing the war game in the company of military circles, we have come up against the phenomenon of the "robotization" of human life. Irving Louis Horowitz argues that those who protest the idea that war is a game do so on moral grounds that leave unanswered tough questions: What is the alternative to playing the game? What will become of us if we allow the opponent to become the better "player" in an all-or-nothing game of extinction? Horowitz provides answers in a logical manner while focusing on facts and ethical alternatives to risky ethics. The work is divided into three sections: The New Civilian Militarists, Thermonuclear Peace and Its Political Equivalents, and General Theory of Conflict and Conflict Resolution. Included are such topics as arms, policies, and games; morals, missiles, and militarism; and conflict, consensus, and cooperation. Horowitz concludes that it is time to register the fact that the basic option to destructive uses of science is not traditional morality, but better science--a science of survival. With a new introduction by Howard Schneiderman along with a major essay and other materials not included in the original edition, this classic work is a worthy contribution to intellectual debate in the twenty-first century and a must read for military strategists, sociologists, and historians.