Volume 5 of the Official History of Intelligence in the Second World War, Strategic Deception, brings the series to an end. It complements Volume 4 which describes the activities of Nazi agents who had been persuaded to work for the Allies by considering how their work for the Allied side was turned to direct military advantage. Strategic deception depends for its success on the availability of good security and good intelligence. The first three volumes of the series described the intelligence channels that gave the Allies their incomparable insight into enemy capabilities and intentions. The fourth described the high level of security achieved within the United Kingdom. Volume 5 explains how this combination of intelligence and security made it possible to deceive the enemy about the strategic intentions of the Allies, and make them greatly overestimate the resources at their disposal. The authoritative story of such classic deception operations as Operation Mincemeat, which preceded the invasion of Sicily; of the non-existent U.S. Army group that pinned down an entire German Army in the Pas de Calais until Montgomery's forces had achieved a secure foothold in Normandy; and the amazing spoof played on the German intelligence authorities by the great double agent GARBO is at last told from official records.

This book explores not only the formal constraints on the conduct of war throughout Western history but also the unwritten conventions about what is permissible in the course of military operations. Ranging from classical antiquity to the present, eminent historians discuss the legal and cultural regulation of violence in such areas as belligerent rights, the treatment of prisoners and civilians, the observing of truces and immunities, the use of particular weapons, siege warfare, codes of honor, and war crimes. The book begins with a general overview of the subject by Michael Howard. The contributors then discuss the formal and informal constraints on conducting war as they existed in classical antiquity, the age of chivalry, early modern Europe, colonial America, and the age of Napoleon. They also examine how these constraints have been applied to wars at sea, on land, and in the air, planning for nuclear war, and national liberation struggles, in which one of the participants is not an organized state. The book concludes with reflections by Paul Kennedy and George Andreopoulos on the main challenges facing the quest for humanitarian norms in warfare in the future.