Preface Introduction Chapter 1 Meaning and Mentalism Fodor and Chomsky Three Reasons Why Mentalism Can't Be Right 1 Meaning Is Holistic 2 Meaning Is in Part a Normative Notion 3 Our Concepts Depend on Our Physical and Social Environment in a Way That Evolution (Which Was Com ... Connections between 1, 2, and 3 Chapter 2 Meaning, Other People, and the World The Division of Linguistic Labor Elms, Beeches, and Searle The Contribution of the Environment An Indexical Component Other Natural Kinds Reference and Theory Change Meaning and "Mental Representation" Chapter 3 Fodor and Block on "Narrow Content" Narrow Content as a "Function of Observable Properties" "Narrow Content" and "Conceptual Role" Concluding Remarks Chapter 4 Are There Such Things as Reference and Truth? Why "Folk Psychology" and Not "Folk Logic"? Disquotation, Anyone? The "Semantical Conception" of Truth Disquotation as Disappearance Chapter 5 Why Functionalism Didn't Work Sociofunctionalism What "In Principle" Means Here The Single-Computational-State Version of Functionalism Equivalence Surveying Rationality Chapter 6 Other Forms of Functionalism David Lewis and I Lewis's Theory Further Examined Conclusion Chapter 7 A Sketch of an Alternative Picture Objectivity and Conceptual Relativity Internal Realism as an Alternative Picture My Present Diagnosis of the "Functionalism" Issue Appendix Notes Author Index

Hilary Putnam's unceasing self-criticism has led to the frequent changes of mind he is famous for, but his thinking is also marked by considerable continuity. A simultaneous interest in science and ethics - unusual in the current climate of contention - has long characterized his thought. In "Philosophy in an Age of Science", Putnam collects his papers for publication - his first volume in almost two decades. Mario De Caro and David Macarthur's introduction identifies central themes to help the reader negotiate between Putnam past and Putnam present: his critique of logical positivism; his enduring aspiration to be realist about rational normativity; his anti-essentialism about a range of central philosophical notions; his reconciliation of the scientific worldview and the humanistic tradition; and his movement from reductive scientific naturalism to liberal naturalism. Putnam returns here to some of his first enthusiasms in philosophy, such as logic, mathematics, and quantum mechanics. The reader is given a glimpse, too, of ideas currently in development on the subject of perception. Putnam's work, contributing to a broad range of philosophical inquiry, has been said to represent a "history of recent philosophy in outline."

First published in 1971, Professor Putnam's essay concerns itself with the ontological problem in the philosophy of logic and mathematics - that is, the issue of whether the abstract entities spoken of in logic and mathematics really exist. He also deals with the question of whether or not reference to these abstract entities is really indispensible in logic and whether it is necessary in physical science in general.

First published in 1990, this is a reissue of Professor Hilary Putname(tm)s dissertation thesis, written in 1951, which concerns itself with The Meaning of the Concept of Probability in Application to Finite Sequences and the problems of the deductive justification for induction. Written under the direction of Putname(tm)s mentor, Hans Reichenbach, the book considers Reichenbache(tm)s idealization of very long finite sequences as infinite sequences and the bearing this has upon Reichenbache(tm)s pragmatic vindication of induction.