This volume in the Praeger Security International (PSI) series "Classics of the Counterinsurgency Era" defines the laws of insurgency and outlines the strategy and tactics to combat such threats. Drawn from the observations of a French officer, David Galula, who witnessed guerrilla warfare on three continents, the book remains relevant today as American policymakers, military analysts, and members of the public look to the counterinsurgency era of the 1960s for lessons to apply to the current situation in Iraq and Afghanistan. With a new foreword by John A. Nagl, author of Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam (Praeger, 2002).

This is the untold story of the small group of men who have devised the plans and shaped the policies on how to use the Bomb. The book (first published in 1983) explores the secret world of these strategists of the nuclear age and brings to light a chapter in American political and military history never before revealed. -- from back cover.

Alperovitz (president, Center for Economic Alternatives) examines the fateful decision of August 1945 and concludes that the US did not need to deploy the atomic bomb to win the war. He shows that Japan was close to surrender and reveals that Truman was advised of alternatives to the bomb by civilian and military advisors, pinning partial blame on incoming secretary of state James F. Byrnes, who was convinced the bomb would be an important diplomatic instrument in dealing with the Soviets. For general readers. Annotation copyright by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR

Jeremi Suri--Nobel Fellow and leading light in the next generation of policy makers--looks to America's history to see both what it has to offer failed states around the world and what it should avoid. Far from being cold imperialists, Americans have earnestly attempted to export their invention of representative government. We have had successes (Reconstruction after the American Civil War, the Philippines, Western Europe) and failures (Vietnam), and we can learn a good deal from both. The framers of the Constitution initiated a policy of cautious nation-building, hoping not to conquer other countries, but to build a world of stable, self-governed societies that would support America's way of life--yet no other country has created more problems for itself and for others by intervening in distant lands and pursuing impractical changes. Suri has mined more than two hundred years of American policy in order to explain the five Ps of nation-building: Partners, Process, Problem-solving, Purpose, and People.--From publisher description.

Investigative reporter Edward Jay Epstein defines the seldom seen universe of intelligence and counterintelligence.Set in the era of the Cold War, it explores the ultimate art of nations: Winning without fighting, or, in a single word, deception. It concerns, as James Jesus Angleton described it to the author, " a state of mind -and the mind of the state." With a new Preface (2014)Praise For Edward Jay Epstein"Epstein delves deep into the wheels-within-wheels of superpower intelligence and counterintelligence, showing ways in which the CIA and the KGB have been "provoked, seduced, lured into false trails, blinded, and turned into unwitting agents." Readers will find new information here on a multitude of subjects: programs involving CIA-written books published under defectors' names; the story of Yuri Nosenko, a KGB officer who defected in 1963 and was "at the heart of everything that happened at the CIA for a decade"; and the theories of James Angleton, the former CIA chief of counterintelligence, on the hidden motives of KGB super-mole Kim Philby. The book concludes with an ominously plausible argument that Gorbachev's glasnost is merely the sixth phase in a grand strategy of Soviet deception conceived soon after the Bolshevik Revolution. Highly recommended."---Publishers Weekly"Epstein's account of the world of intelligence is fascinating, instructive, and, in parts, sensational."-Irving Kristol American Enterprise Institute"This is an important book that reflects an epoch in United States counterintelligence operations and philosophy."-William R. Harris The RAND Corporation"A brilliant investigator examines the fascinating history of glasnost and the unseen motives and machinery of the Soviet state."-Lou Dobbs, CNN

With the end of the Cold War came not the end of history, but the end of America's sense of its strategic purpose in the world. Then, after a decade of drift, the US was violently dragged back into international conflict. Its armed forces responded magnificently but its leaders' objectives were substantially flawed. We fought the wrong war—twice—for reasons that were opaque, and few American citizens understood the cause for which their sons and daughters were fighting and dying. War is a poor substitute for strategic vision, and decisions made in the heat of imminent conflict are often limited by the emotions of the moment. In Don't Wait for the Next War , Wesley K. Clark, a retired four-star general of the US army and former Democratic candidate for president, presents a compelling argument for continued American global leadership and the basis on which it can succeed—a new American strategy. America needs both new power and deeper perspective. The platform for American leadership is to use America's energy resources to spark sustainable economic growth, building new strength to deal with pressing domestic issues like the deficit as well as the longer term challenges to US security—terrorism, cyber threats, the next financial crisis, China's rising power, and climate change. Such a strategy is not only achievable but essential, and it is urgently needed. This is the true test of American leadership for the next two decades, but it must start now, so America has the power and vision to deal with the acute crises that will inevitably come—in the Mideast, Europe, or Asia.

This book distinguishes itself by the author's ability to dispel clichés and elucidate the factual underpinnings of the ongoing naval warfare. The author possesses a lucid and pragmatic understanding of contemporary sea power, recognizing it as a practical rather than a convoluted concept. Unlike many works, this book does not promise a quick route to victory and avoids the typical broad and disdainful criticisms of the British and American high commands. Instead, the author elucidates the intricate challenges these commands have encountered, articulating the complexities in non-specialized language. The text notably avoids excessive use of tactical jargon.

"Kimberly Kagan ... [describes] the complete operational history of the surge from its inception to the end of 2007. Kagan's detailed analysis looks at the external players -- from al Qaeda in Iraq, and the Iranian-backed Special Groups, to the Jaysh al Mahdi -- and covers the day-to-day strategies, locations, tactics, organization, and responses to American actions" -- Jacket.