The true cost of the Iraq War is $3 trillion rather than the $50 billion projected by the White House. Apart from its tragic human toll, the Iraq War will be staggeringly expensive in financial terms. This sobering study by Nobel Prize winner Joseph E. Stiglitz and Harvard professor Linda J. Bilmes casts a spotlight on expense items that have been hidden from the U.S. taxpayer, including not only big-ticket items like replacing military equipment (being used up at six times the peacetime rate) but also the cost of caring for thousands of wounded veterans for the rest of their lives. Shifting to a global focus, the authors investigate the cost in lives and economic damage within Iraq and the region. Finally, with the chilling precision of an actuary, the authors measure what the U.S. taxpayer's money would have produced if instead it had been invested in the further growth of the U.S. economy. Written in language as simple as the details are disturbing, this book will forever change the way we think about the war.

Publisher's description: Robert Rubin was sworn in as the seventieth U.S. Secretary of the Treasury in January 1995 in a brisk ceremony attended only by his wife and a few colleagues. As soon as the ceremony was over, he began an emergency meeting with President Bill Clinton on the financial crisis in Mexico. This was not only a harbinger of things to come during what would prove to be a rocky period in the global economy; it also captured the essence of Rubin himself--short on formality, quick to get into the nitty-gritty. From his early years in the storied arbitrage department at Goldman Sachs to his current position as chairman of the executive committee of Citigroup, Robert Rubin has been a major figure at the center of the American financial system. He was a key player in the longest economic expansion in U.S. history.

The evolution of the national security state in the United States can be traced from the political, military, and economic dimensions of American power in the postwar world. In Raskin's view, the United States emerged from the Second World War with tremendously increased prestige and material power, and American leadership created a national security apparatus as a planning instrument to ensure national stability, to mute class conflicts, and to secure the domestic economy. This state then became the basis around the world for covert and overt imperialism.The consensus that developed served to maintain stability at home and to guide the modern empire abroad. This development required a state that was orderly and that was predicated on modern bureaucracy, which operated within the values and assumptions of the ruling elites.The national security state system was successful primarily in the economic sphere, with bipartisan foreign-policy decision making aimed at ensuring a stable business climate at home and abroad. Military involvement in Indochina evidenced the decline of American hegemony; the genocidal nature of the arms race and the questions raised by protestors of the sixties signaled the break up of the national security consensus.Raskin concludes the book with an examination of alternative directions, especially regarding the need and the possibilities for renewed public debate of national policy and purpose.