The former dean of the Yale School of Management and Undersecretary of Commerce in the Clinton administration chronicles the 1971 August meeting at Camp David, where President Nixon unilaterally ended the last vestiges of the gold standard--breaking the link between gold and the dollar--transforming the entire global monetary system. Over the course of three days--from August 13 to 15, 1971--at a secret meeting at Camp David, President Richard Nixon and his brain trust changed the course of history. Before that weekend, all national currencies were valued to the U.S. dollar, which was convertible to gold at a fixed rate. That system, established by the Bretton Woods Agreement at the end of World War II, was the foundation of the international monetary system that helped fuel the greatest expansion of middle-class prosperity the world has ever seen. In making his decision, Nixon shocked world leaders, bankers, investors, traders and everyone involved in global finance. Jeffrey E. Garten argues that many of the roots of America's dramatic retrenchment in world affairs began with that momentous event that was an admission that America could no longer afford to uphold the global monetary system. It opened the way for massive market instability and speculation that has plagued the world economy ever since, but at the same time it made possible the gigantic expansion of trade and investment across borders which created our modern era of once unimaginable progress. Based on extensive historical research and interviews with several participants at Camp David, and informed by Garten's own insights from positions in four presidential administrations and on Wall Street, Three Days at Camp David chronicles this critical turning point, analyzes its impact on the American economy and world markets, and explores its ramifications now and for the future.

Publisher's description: Robert Rubin was sworn in as the seventieth U.S. Secretary of the Treasury in January 1995 in a brisk ceremony attended only by his wife and a few colleagues. As soon as the ceremony was over, he began an emergency meeting with President Bill Clinton on the financial crisis in Mexico. This was not only a harbinger of things to come during what would prove to be a rocky period in the global economy; it also captured the essence of Rubin himself--short on formality, quick to get into the nitty-gritty. From his early years in the storied arbitrage department at Goldman Sachs to his current position as chairman of the executive committee of Citigroup, Robert Rubin has been a major figure at the center of the American financial system. He was a key player in the longest economic expansion in U.S. history.

It is widely acknowledged among economists today that their discipline is in a state of some disarray. Behind the controversies particular to the times lies a fundamental crisis of thought, rooted in the increasingly apparent inadequacy of the neoclassical approach that has been dominant for some fifty years. The failure to impose such a formalistic framework has fostered the return from the wilderness of the subjectivist Austrian School of economics and renewed debate on the nature of markets and the predictability of economic phenomena. Until recently subjectivist economics has been largely ignored by mainstream economists. But as the dominant neoclassical, Keynesian, and monetarist approaches have each been championed in turn only to be found wanting at the end of the day, the Austrian approach has come to seem increasingly promising. In this book, first published in 1986 and now reprinted with a new foreword from Solomon M. Stein and Virgil Henry Storr, Ludwig M. Lachmann presents his case for viewing economic events as elements within an ongoing process dependent on human actions in a world where the future, though not unimaginable, is unknowable. In stark contrast to the mechanistic world view of mainstream orthodoxy, his perspective takes due account of the complex workings of the human mind. His insistence on the variety of ways in which markets may function warns against elevating any "process" theory to the levels of abstraction characteristic of neoclassical equilibrium theory. Drawing easily on the classics as well as the most recent theoretical developments, Lachmann sheds new light on each of the areas he discusses. Ludwig M. Lachmann (1906-1990) witnessed and participated in numerous controversies for over fifty years as a leading member of the Austrian School, while remaining receptive to ideas from a diversity of disciplines and schools of thought. He studied under F. A. Hayek at the London School of Economics in the 1930s, and was a distinguished member of the Austrian School of economics and has played an active part in its revival over the past ten years. His previous publications include Capital and its Structure (1956), The Legacy of Max Weber (1970), and Capital Expectations and the Market Process (1977).

The panic of 1819 was America's first great economic crisis. And this is Murray Rothbard's masterful account, the first full scholarly book on the topic and still the most definitive. It was his dissertation, published in 1962 but nearly impossible to get until this new edition.The American Economic Review was wild for this book when it appeared: "Rothbard's work represents the only published, book-length, academic treatise on the remedies that were proposed, debated, and enacted in attempts to cope with the crisis of 1819," the reviewer wrote. "As such, the book should certainly find a place on the shelf of the study of U.S. business cycles and of the economic historian who is interested in the early economic development of the United States."And specialists have treasured the book for years. It is incredible to realize that some American historians think of M.N. Rothbard as the author of this book and nothing else!The panic of 1819 grew largely out of the changes wrought by the War of 1812, and by the postwar boom that followed. The war also brought a rash of paper money, as the government borrowed heavily to finance the conflict. This would inevitably lead to suspension of specie payments in some parts of the country in 1814.Freed from the shackles of hard money, the suspension of specie led to a boom. When peace came, the so did the bust.But in the end, there was no widespread confusion on what caused the downturn. Instead, it was widely known that false prosperity is a very dangerous thing. It always turns to bust. But unlike today, the government didn't intervene. And precisely because there was no intervention, the panic ended quickly and peacefully.What we have here, then, is not only a dazzling historical account — the research here is deep and thorough, and the prose a model of exposition; it also points the way to how all economic downturns can and should be handled. For that reason, the Panic of 1819 offers important lessons for us today.To search for Mises Institute titles, enter a keyword and LvMI (short for Ludwig von Mises Institute); e.g., Depression LvMI