3 results for "Economics"

Contract as promise: a theory of contractual obligation

Fried, Charles
'Contract as Promise' is a study of the foundations and structure of contract law. It has both theoretical and pedagogic purposes. It moves from trust to promise to the nuts and bolts of contract law. The author shows that contract law has an underlying unifying moral and practical structure. This second edition retains the original text, and includes a new Preface. It also includes a lengthy postscript that takes account of scholarly and practical developments in the field over the last thirty years, especially the large and rich law and economics literature.
Oxford University Press 2015 202 pages

Contract law and theory

Posner, Eric A.
Contract Law and Theory conveys a grasp of theory and policy that makes all of the contract rules easier to understand. By explaining and applying contract theory to a wide range of contracts cases, Eric Posner reveals not only the "what" of doctrine but also the "why"--why one rule rather than another makes sense from a policy perspective. An understanding of what contract theory is and how it is applied will help you to understand not only Contracts, as taught in law school, but also the many areas of law in which contractual ideas operate, such as bankruptcy law, secured transactions, and corporate law. An exciting new Student Treatise from an eminent authority, Contract Law and Theory features: Complete coverage of contracts that includes the principal cases covered in most first-year contracts courses A general explication of the rules of contract that begins with the simplest ideas and gradually builds in complexity A consistent emphasis on the application of theory to doctrine, through analysis of a rich selection of cases A readable and expert treatment of the role of economics in contract law Illustrative examples that point to noteworthy cases Suitable for use alongside any casebook
Wolters Kluwer Law & Business 2011 243 pages

Firms, contracts, and financial structure

Hart, Oliver D.
This book provides a framework for thinking about economic institutions such as firms. The basic idea is that institutions arise in situations where people write incomplete contracts and where the allocation of power or control is therefore important. Power and control are not standard concepts in economic theory. The book begins by pointing out that traditional approaches cannot explain on the one hand why all transactions do not take place in one huge firm and on the other hand why firms matter at all. An incomplete contracting or property rights approach is then developed. It is argued that this approach can throw light on the boundaries of firms and on the meaning of asset ownership. In the remainder of the book, incomplete contracting ideas are applied to understand firms' financial decisions, in particular, the nature of debt and equity (why equity has votes and creditors have foreclosure rights); the capital structure decisions of public companies; bankruptcy procedure; and the allocation of voting rights across a company's shares. The book is written in a fairly non-technical style and includes many examples. It is aimed at advanced undergraduate and graduate students, academic and business economists, and lawyers, as well as those with an interest in corporate finance, privatization and regulation, and the transition from socialism to capitalism. Little background knowledge is required, since the concepts are developed as the book progresses and the existing literature is fully reviewed.
Clarendon Press 1995-12-07 228 pages