Recent statistical techniques, including nonlinear programming, have been added to a basic survey of equilibrium systems, comparative statistics, consumer behavior theory, and cost and production theory.

Wassily Leontief (1905–1999) was the founding father of input-output economics, for which he received the Nobel Prize in 1973. This book offers a collection of papers in memory of Leontief by his students and close colleagues. The first part, 'Reflections on Input-Output Economics', focuses upon Leontief as a person and scholar as well as his personal contributions to economics. It includes contributions by Nobel Laureate Paul A. Samuelson who shares his memories of a young Professor Leontief at Harvard and ends with the last joint interview with Wassily and his wife, to date previously unpublished. The second part, 'Perspectives of Input-Output Economics', includes theoretical and empirical research inspired by Leontief's work and offers a wide-ranging sample of the state of interindustry economics, a field Leontief founded. This is a strong collection likely to appeal to a wide range of professionals in universities, government, industry and international organizations.

A mechanism is a mathematical structure that models institutions through which economic activity is guided and coordinated. There are many such institutions; markets are the most familiar ones. Lawmakers, administrators and officers of private companies create institutions in orders to achieve desired goals. They seek to do so in ways that economize on the resources needed to operate the institutions, and that provide incentives that induce the required behaviors. This book presents systematic procedures for designing mechanisms that achieve specified performance, and economize on the resources required to operate the mechanism, i.e., informationally efficient mechanisms. Our systematic design procedures are algorithms for designing informationally efficient mechanisms. Most of the book deals with these procedures of design. When there are finitely many environments to be dealt with, and there is a Nash-implementing mechanism, our algorithms can be used to make that mechanism into an informationally efficient one. Informationally efficient dominant strategy implementation is also studied.

"This is the first of four volumes of the collected papers of Leonid Hurwicz, one of the premier mathematical economists of the 20th century whose research spanned over 6 decades. A co-recipient of the 200 7NobelMemorial Prize (with Eric Maskin and Roger Myerson) for "laying the foundations of mechanism design" - the design of decentralized institutions to bring about socially desirable outcomes when markets may fail to do so - Leo's contribution to economics has been far wider, ranging from econometrics, programming, and decision theory to microeconomic theory. It has been said that his classic 1971 paper with Hirofumi Uzawa on the integrability of demand functions alone qualifed him for the Nobel"--

"Keynes's General Theory has been misunderstood as relying on frictions to justify the need for the visible hand of government to complement the invisible hand of the market. Fleshing out the GT with tools not available to Keynes, Marglin exposes the fundamental failure of markets to self-regulate and draws lessons for fiscal and monetary policies"--

An introduction to the use of probability models for analyzing risk and economic decisions, using spreadsheets to represent and simulate uncertainty. This textbook offers an introduction to the use of probability models for analyzing risks and economic decisions. It takes a learn-by-doing approach, teaching the student to use spreadsheets to represent and simulate uncertainty and to analyze the effect of such uncertainty on an economic decision. Students in applied business and economics can more easily grasp difficult analytical methods with Excel spreadsheets. The book covers the basic ideas of probability, how to simulate random variables, and how to compute conditional probabilities via Monte Carlo simulation. The first four chapters use a large collection of probability distributions to simulate a range of problems involving worker efficiency, market entry, oil exploration, repeated investment, and subjective belief elicitation. The book then covers correlation and multivariate normal random variables; conditional expectation; optimization of decision variables, with discussions of the strategic value of information, decision trees, game theory, and adverse selection; risk sharing and finance; dynamic models of growth; dynamic models of arrivals; and model risk. New material in this second edition includes two new chapters on additional dynamic models and model risk; new sections in every chapter; many new end-of-chapter exercises; and coverage of such topics as simulation model workflow, models of probabilistic electoral forecasting, and real options. The book comes equipped with Simtools, an open-source, free software used througout the book, which allows students to conduct Monte Carlo simulations seamlessly in Excel.

Composed in honour of the sixty-fifth birthday of Lloyd Shapley, this volume makes accessible the large body of work that has grown out of Shapley's seminal 1953 paper. Each of the twenty essays concerns some aspect of the Shapley value. Three of the chapters are reprints of the 'ancestral' papers: Chapter 2 is Shapley's original 1953 paper defining the value; Chapter 3 is the 1954 paper by Shapley and Shubik applying the value to voting models; and chapter 19 is Shapley's 1969 paper defining a value for games without transferable utility. The other seventeen chapters were contributed especially for this volume. The first chapter introduces the subject and the other essays in the volume, and contains a brief account of a few of Shapley's other major contributions to game theory. The other chapters cover the reformulations, interpretations and generalizations that have been inspired by the Shapley value, and its applications to the study of coalition formulation, to the organization of large markets, to problems of cost allocation, and to the study of games in which utility is not transferable.

Since the publication of "Theory of Games and Economic Behavior" by von Neumann and Morgenstern, the concept of games has played an increasing role in economics. It also plays a role of growing importance in other sciences, including biology, political science, and psychology. Many scientists have made seminal advances and continue to be leaders in the field, including Harsanyi, Shapley, Shubik, and Selten. Professor Robert Aumann, in addition to his important contributions to game theory and economics, made a number of significant contributions to mathematics. This volume provides a collection of essays in mathematical economics and game theory, including cutting-edge research on noncooperative game theory and its foundations, bargaining theory, and general equilibrium theory. Also included is a reprint of Aumann's classic paper, "Acceptable Points in General Cooperative n-Person Games" and of the oft-cited, yet hard to find, paper by Maschler, "The Worth of a Cooperative Enterprise to Each Member". This book illustrates the wide range of applications of mathematics to economics, game theory, and social choice. The volume is dedicated to Professor Robert J. Aumann, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel, for his contributions in mathematics and social sciences.