"Chemical Engineering: An Introduction is designed to enable the student to explore a broad range of activities in which a modern cheical engineer might be involved by focusing on mass and energy balances in liquid-phase processes. Thus, in one semester, the student addresses such problems as the design of a feedback level controller, membrane separation, and hemodialysis, optimal design of a process with chemical reaction and separation, washout in a bioreactor, kinetic and mass transfer limits in a two-phase reactor, and the use of the membrane reactor to overcome equilibrium limits on conversion. Mathematics is employed as a language, but the mathematics is at the most elementary level and serves to reinforce what the student has already studied; nothing more than basic differential and integral calculus is required, together with elementary chemistry. Students using this text will understand what they can expect to do as chemical engineering graduates, and they will appreciate why they need the courses that follow in the core curriculum"--

Hazop and hazan were developed to identify and assess hazards in the process industries. The use of these techniques leads to safer plants, the elimination of many operational problems at the design stage and improvement in reliability. Understanding the practical issues involved in the correct implementation of these techniques is the theme of this book. It provides the basics of applying hazard and operability study (Hazop) and hazard analysis (Hazan).

6.5 The Clapham Junction railway accident -- 6.6 Piper Alpha -- 6.7 What more can senior managers do? -- 6.8 The measurement of safety -- 6.9 Conclusions -- 7: The probability of human error -- 7.1 Why do we need to know human error rates? -- 7.3 A more complex example -- 7.2 Human error rates - a simple example -- 7.4 Other estimates of human error rates -- 7.5 Two more simple examples -- 7.6 Button pressing -- 7.7 Non-process operations -- 7.8 Train driver errors -- 7.9 Some pitfalls in using data on human reliability -- 7.10 Data on equipment may be data on people -- 7.11 Who makes the errors? -- 7.12 Conclusions -- 8: Some accidents that could be prevented by better design -- 8.1 Isolation of protective equipment -- 8.2 Better information display -- 8.3 Pipe failures -- 8.4 Vessel failures -- 8.5 The Sellafield leak -- 8.6 Other design errors -- 8.7 Conceptual shortcomings -- 8.8 Problems of design contractors -- 8.9 Domestic accidents -- 9: Some accidents that could be prevented by better construction -- 9.1 Pipe failures -- 9.2 Miscellaneous incidents -- 9.3 Prevention of construction errors -- 10: Some accidents that could be prevented by better maintenance -- 10.1 Incidents which occurred because people did not understand how equipment worked -- 10.2 Incidents which occurred because of poor maintenance practice -- 10.3 Incidents due to gross ignorance or incompetence -- 10.4 Incidents which occurred because people took short cuts -- 10.5 Incidents which could be prevented by more frequent or better maintenance -- 10.6 Can we avoid the need for so much maintenance? -- 11: Some accidents that could be prevented by better methods of operation -- 11.1 Permits-to-work -- 11.2 Tanker incidents -- 11.3 Some incidents that could be prevented by better instructions -- 11.4 Some incidents involving hoses -- 11.5 Communication failures