6.5 The Clapham Junction railway accident -- 6.6 Piper Alpha -- 6.7 What more can senior managers do? -- 6.8 The measurement of safety -- 6.9 Conclusions -- 7: The probability of human error -- 7.1 Why do we need to know human error rates? -- 7.3 A more complex example -- 7.2 Human error rates - a simple example -- 7.4 Other estimates of human error rates -- 7.5 Two more simple examples -- 7.6 Button pressing -- 7.7 Non-process operations -- 7.8 Train driver errors -- 7.9 Some pitfalls in using data on human reliability -- 7.10 Data on equipment may be data on people -- 7.11 Who makes the errors? -- 7.12 Conclusions -- 8: Some accidents that could be prevented by better design -- 8.1 Isolation of protective equipment -- 8.2 Better information display -- 8.3 Pipe failures -- 8.4 Vessel failures -- 8.5 The Sellafield leak -- 8.6 Other design errors -- 8.7 Conceptual shortcomings -- 8.8 Problems of design contractors -- 8.9 Domestic accidents -- 9: Some accidents that could be prevented by better construction -- 9.1 Pipe failures -- 9.2 Miscellaneous incidents -- 9.3 Prevention of construction errors -- 10: Some accidents that could be prevented by better maintenance -- 10.1 Incidents which occurred because people did not understand how equipment worked -- 10.2 Incidents which occurred because of poor maintenance practice -- 10.3 Incidents due to gross ignorance or incompetence -- 10.4 Incidents which occurred because people took short cuts -- 10.5 Incidents which could be prevented by more frequent or better maintenance -- 10.6 Can we avoid the need for so much maintenance? -- 11: Some accidents that could be prevented by better methods of operation -- 11.1 Permits-to-work -- 11.2 Tanker incidents -- 11.3 Some incidents that could be prevented by better instructions -- 11.4 Some incidents involving hoses -- 11.5 Communication failures