"From the three primary architects of the American policy response to the worst economic catastrophe since the Great Depression, a magnificent big-picture synthesis--from why it happened to where we are now In 2018, Ben Bernanke, Tim Geithner, and Hank Paulson came together to reflect on the lessons of the 2008 financial crisis ten years on. Recognizing that, as Ben put it, "the enemy is forgetting," they examine the causes of the crisis, why it was so damaging, and what it ultimately took to prevent a second Great Depression. And they provide to their successors in the United States and the finance ministers and central bank governors of other countries a valuable playbook for reducing the damage from future financial crises. Firefighting provides a candid and powerful account of the choices they and their teams made during the crisis, working under two presidents and with the leaders of Congress"--

Revealing a history of mysterious deaths, shady characters, and moral and political tensions, exposes the inner workings of the Catholic Church to trace how the Vatican evolved from an institution of faith into an extremely wealthy corporate power. --Publisher's description.

"For anyone interested in the world behind the business-page headlines, this is the book to read." --Publishers Weekly With the same breadth of vision and narrative élan he brought to his monumental biographies of the great financiers, Ron Chernow examines the forces that made dynasties like the Morgans, the Warburgs, and the Rothschilds the financial arbiters of the early twentieth century and then rendered them virtually obsolete by the century's end. As he traces the shifting balance of power among investors, borrowers, and bankers, Chernow evokes both the grand theater of capital and the personal dramas of its most fascinating protagonists. Here is Siegmund Warburg, who dropped a client in the heat of a takeover deal because the man wore monogrammed shirt cuffs, as well as the imperious J. P. Morgan, who, when faced with a federal antitrust suit, admonished Theodore Roosevelt to "send your man to my man and they can fix it up." And here are the men who usurped their power, from the go-getters of the 1920s to the masters of the universe of the 1980s. Glittering with perception and anecdote, The Death of the Banker is at once a panorama of twentieth-century finance and a guide to the new era of giant mutual funds on Wall Street. "Chernow . . . delivers a sound, accessible account of the forces shaping capital, credit, currency, and securities markets on the eve of a new millennium. " --Kirkus Reviews

National Book Award winner Ron Chernow expertly traces the decline of the big bankers and the rise of small investors. The reader is taken on a fascinating tour of Anglo-American high finance over the past two centuries, with detours into Canadian, German and Japanese finance. As the point of departure for his colourful, panoramic survey, Mr. Chernow poses a historic riddle: Why did the great financial dynasties - the Rothschilds, Barings, Morgans and Warburgs - flare so brilliantly in the 19th and 20th centuries and then enter into a precipitous decline? Why did such heavyweights give way to more anonymous financial conglomerates? And, most curious of all, why have small investors, banded together in mutual funds, suddenly inherited the financial earth? The Death of the Banker shows how American reformers mounted a spirited campaign to pry captive companies loose from their traditional bankers and restored competition to financial markets. In a world criss-crossed by capital flows, the banker will never again exercise such spectacular but arbitrary rule over clients.

There are already many papers and books on the causes and course of the current financial crisis, but this is the first and, for the moment, only such book to focus on the regulatory response to it. There are two main attributes that a bank needs to remain in business during a period of turmoil, liquidity to enable it to pay its debts when due, and capital, to absorb losses. Both have been insufficient. Charles Goodhart describes what went wrong and what needs to be done, alongside discussions of deposit insurance, credit rating agencies, prompt corrective action, etc. Charles Goodhart is the senior British economist specialising in financial stability issues. As the turmoil began, continued and exploded into crisis, he has kept up a series of commentaries, all since September 2007. These have been brought together, plus some new and additional material, to provide the reader with an overview of what went wrong in the regulatory framework for the financial system, and what now needs to be done to put that right. This will be required reading for financial regulators, practitioners in banking and finance, academics and students of finance, and those just wanting to know what went wrong and what to do now.