"Poker champion turned business consultant Annie Duke teaches you how to get comfortable with uncertainty and make better decisions as a result. In Super Bowl XLIX, Seahawks coach Pete Carroll made one of the most controversial calls in football history: With 26 seconds remaining, and trailing by four at the Patriots' one-yard line, he called for a pass instead of a hand off to his star running back. The pass was intercepted and the Seahawks lost. Critics called it the dumbest play in history. But was the call really that bad? Or did Carroll actually make a great move that was ruined by bad luck? Even the best decision doesn't yield the best outcome every time. There's always an element of luck that you can't control, and there is always information that is hidden from view. So the key to long-term success (and avoiding worrying yourself to death) is to think in bets: How sure am I? What are the possible ways things could turn out? What decision has the highest odds of success? Did I land in the unlucky 10% on the strategy that works 90% of the time? Or is my success attributable to dumb luck rather than great decision making? Annie Duke, a former World Series of Poker champion turned business consultant, draws on examples from business, sports, politics, and (of course) poker to share tools anyone can use to embrace uncertainty and make better decisions. For most people, it's difficult to say "I'm not sure" in a world that values and, even, rewards the appearance of certainty. But professional poker players are comfortable with the fact that great decisions don't always lead to great outcomes and bad decisions don't always lead to bad outcomes. By shifting your thinking from a need for certainty to a goal of accurately assessing what you know and what you don't, you'll be less vulnerable to reactive emotions, knee-jerk biases, and destructive habits in your decision making. You'll become more confident, calm, compassionate and successful in the long run"--

The Mossad is widely recognized today as the best intelligence service in the world. It is also the most enigmatic, shrouded in secrecy. This book unveils the defining and most dangerous operations that have shaped Israel and the world at large from the agency's more than sixty-year history, among them: the capture of Adolf Eichmann, the eradication of Black September, the destruction of the Syrian nuclear facility, and the elimination of key Iranian nuclear scientists. Through intensive research and exclusive interviews with Israeli leaders and Mossad agents, authors Michael Bar-Zohar and Nissim Mishal re-create these missions in riveting detail, vividly bringing to life the heroic operatives who risked everything in the face of unimaginable danger.--From publisher description.

"Examines how presidential decisionmaking has been influenced by America's defeat in the Vietnam war, studying presidents Ford, Carter, Reagan, George H. W. Bush, Clinton, George W. Bush, and Obama and how they have approached key decisions regarding conflicts while in office"--Provided by publisher.

“A convincing case that careful analysis of the history, issues, individuals, and institutions can lead to better decisions—in business as well as in government” ( BusinessWeek ). Two noted professors offer easily remembered rules for using history effectively in day-to-day management of governmental and corporate affairs to avoid costly blunders. “An illuminating guide to the use and abuse of history in affairs of state” (Arthur Schlesinger).

Based on hundreds of interviews and research, Helmreich concludes that many common missteps aren't only a result of psychological problems; they're also based on our culture, history, and values.

How did ancient Jewish authors claim authority for their interpretations? How, after the a oeend of prophecya, could they claim the authority of revelation? Whom did one have to be, or aspire to be, in order to merit authority? Hindy Najman addresses these questions through close readings of ancient Jewish texts, e.g., Ezra-Nehemiah, Philo of Alexandria, 4Ezra, Dead Sea Scrolls, and Jubilees. In Seconding Sinai (Brill, 2003), Najman reconceived pseudepigraphy, developing the idea of a Mosaic discourse that comprised a series of ancient texts attributed to Moses. Here she develops the broader notion of a discourse tied to a founder, situating practices of pseudepigraphy and authoritative interpretation within a variety of ways of seeking perfection in ancient Judaism.

At sixteen Bridget is pregnant--and her boyfriend has dumped her for another girl. She's trying to envision a future for her baby. But as she sifts through the many paths and the many people who want to parent her child, she can't help but feel that there is no right decision. Fifteen years later: Ivy knows that she is now the same age Bridget was when she placed Ivy for adoption. She knows that Bridget was the one who named her. When Ivy goes in search of Bridget--of her own history--will the risks outweigh the benefits of knowing where she comes from and why her birth mother chose to walk away?

War gaming has become a characteristic feature of modern life. From amateur clubs to professional academicians playing the war game in the company of military circles, we have come up against the phenomenon of the "robotization" of human life. Irving Louis Horowitz argues that those who protest the idea that war is a game do so on moral grounds that leave unanswered tough questions: What is the alternative to playing the game? What will become of us if we allow the opponent to become the better "player" in an all-or-nothing game of extinction? Horowitz provides answers in a logical manner while focusing on facts and ethical alternatives to risky ethics. The work is divided into three sections: The New Civilian Militarists, Thermonuclear Peace and Its Political Equivalents, and General Theory of Conflict and Conflict Resolution. Included are such topics as arms, policies, and games; morals, missiles, and militarism; and conflict, consensus, and cooperation. Horowitz concludes that it is time to register the fact that the basic option to destructive uses of science is not traditional morality, but better science--a science of survival. With a new introduction by Howard Schneiderman along with a major essay and other materials not included in the original edition, this classic work is a worthy contribution to intellectual debate in the twenty-first century and a must read for military strategists, sociologists, and historians.