This book is written by two individuals with very different experiences in international relations, one, a career diplomat with some results to show at the UN, the other a practising therapist, and both concerned to develop the links between the psychological and the political worlds. The book focuses on the possibility of change in both the structure and process of current international relations in the hope of making contribution to the resolution of conflict. The book is about life and not theory, and part of the narrative is about the authors own experiences of sitting with the enemy and sometimes solving issues with them. Together, the authors explore what lies behind the hostile facade of the other, what alienates us, and how, in spite of the aggression, there is sometimes the potential for shared mutual interests. Conflict resolution is a vital subject in international relations, both in theory and in practical politics. This book does not claim to be a free-standing study of international relations and its theory and practice but of the underlying factors making up the mindsets of those involved in conflict resolution, and this will be the books unique contribution. It is conceived as a collection of studies of conflict resolution that examine how the psychological issues are affected by history and culture, and how we construct identity. These are all fundamental elements underlying the basic East-West division and mutual miscomprehension which are set out in detail in the accounts of negotiations in the book.

A firsthand account of how the Bush administration mismanaged its Afghan campaign, A Vulcan's Tale shines new and important light on the events and people behind the headlines in the immediate years following the September 11 attacks. The "Vulcans," so named by Condoleezza Rice, were eight foreign policy experts who advised George W. Bush during his 2000 presidential campaign. After Bush assumed the presidency, the Vulcans helped shape the administration’s foreign policy following 9/11, including the military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. All were veterans of past administrations, having served under either Ronald Reagan or George H. W. Bush, and they included among their ranks Dov Zakheim. Made comptroller and chief financial officer for the Department of Defense in 2001, Zakheim was also named the DoD’s coordinator for Afghan civilian reconstruction in 2002. In A Vulcan's Tale , Zakheim draws on his own participation and intimate knowledge to analyze how the United States missed critical opportunities while it struggled to manage two wars, particularly the seemingly endless endeavor in Afghanistan. In his view, the Bush administration's disappointing results in Afghanistan were partly attributable to the enormity of the challenges, certainly. But flawed leadership and deficiencies of management, understanding, and forethought all played their parts as well. The power of the purse proved to be especially damaging. The Office of Management and Budget was slow to fund Defense's efforts at the outset of the Afghan conflict and then inadequately funded the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development, casting the die for several additional years of conflict. The invasion of Iraq siphoned off critical resources for Afghanistan, thereby further complicating that country's reconstruction. Even with public policy of the highest order, the devil still lurked in the details, as the DoD's "money man" was soon to discover while he struggled to fund and manage the reconstruction of civilian Afghanistan. A Vulcan's Tale is an authoritative, candid but fair account of how a wise and admirable goal can be waylaid by insufficient funding and ineffective coordination, with the result of faulty—or, at best, incomplete—implementation.

It has long been assumed that leaders engage in international conflict to unify their followers—what is often called the “rally ’round the flag” hypothesis. Despite its intuitive appeal, however, this hypothesis does not always provide a compelling explanation of the relationship between domestic politics and international conflict. In United We Stand? Aaron Belkin shows that in one important realm, civil-military relations, leaders often prefer divisiveness over cohesion. When they feel domestically vulnerable, leaders use international conflict in order to create and exacerbate rivalries among their own military forces to lower the risk of a coup and to contribute to the consolidation and stability of the political order. Case studies include post-Soviet Georgia and Syria.