Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining provides a comprehensive picture of the new developments in bargaining theory. It especially shows the way the use of axiomatic models has been complemented by the new results derived from strategic models. The papers in this volume are edited versions of those given at a conference on Game Theoretic Models of Bargaining held at the University of Pittsburgh. There are two distinct reasons why the study of bargaining is of fundamental importance in economics. The first is that many aspects of economic activity are directly influenced by bargaining between and among individuals, firms, and nations. The second is that bargaining occupies an important place in economic theory, since the 'pure bargaining problem' is at the opposite pole of economic phenomena from the case of 'perfect competition'. This volume is an outgrowth of the renewed interest in the strategic approach to the theory of bargaining and to the general theory of non-cooperative games.

Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining provides a comprehensive picture of the new developments in bargaining theory. It especially shows the way the use of axiomatic models has been complemented by the new results derived from strategic models. The papers in this volume are edited versions of those given at a conference on Game Theoretic Models of Bargaining held at the University of Pittsburgh. There are two distinct reasons why the study of bargaining is of fundamental importance in economics. The first is that many aspects of economic activity are directly influenced by bargaining between and among individuals, firms, and nations. The second is that bargaining occupies an important place in economic theory, since the 'pure bargaining problem' is at the opposite pole of economic phenomena from the case of 'perfect competition'. This volume is an outgrowth of the renewed interest in the strategic approach to the theory of bargaining and to the general theory of non-cooperative games.

Human decision-making often transcends our formal models of "rationality." Designing intelligent agents that interact proficiently with people necessitates the modeling of human behavior and the prediction of their decisions. In this book, we explore the task of automatically predicting human decision-making and its use in designing intelligent human-aware automated computer systems of varying natures--from purely conflicting interaction settings (e.g., security and games) to fully cooperative interaction settings (e.g., autonomous driving and personal robotic assistants). We explore the techniques, algorithms, and empirical methodologies for meeting the challenges that arise from the above tasks and illustrate major benefits from the use of these computational solutions in real-world application domains such as security, negotiations, argumentative interactions, voting systems, autonomous driving, and games. The book presents both the traditional and classical methods as well as the most recent and cutting-edge advances, providing the reader with a panorama of the challenges and solutions in predicting human decision-making.