Writing in the June 1965 issue of the "Economic Journal", Harry G. Johnson begins with a sentence seemingly calibrated to the scale of the book he set himself to review: 'The long-awaited "Monetary History of the United States" by Friedman and Schwartz is in every sense of the term a monumental scholarly achievement - monumental in its sheer bulk, monumental in the definitiveness of its treatment of innumerable issues, large and small ...monumental, above all, in the theoretical and statistical effort and ingenuity that have been brought to bear on the solution of complex and subtle economic issues'.Friedman and Schwartz marshaled massive historical data and sharp analytics to support the claim that monetary policy - steady control of the money supply - matters profoundly in the management of the nation's economy, especially in navigating serious economic fluctuations. In their influential chapter 7, "The Great Contraction" - which Princeton published in 1965 as a separate paperback - they address the central economic event of the century, the Depression. According to Hugh Rockoff, writing in January 1965: 'If Great Depressions could be prevented through timely actions by the monetary authority (or by a monetary rule), as Friedman and Schwartz had contended, then the case for market economies was measurably stronger.' Milton Friedman won the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2000 for work related to "A Monetary History " as well as to his other Princeton University Press book, "A Theory of the Consumption Function" (1957). Review: "A monumental scholarly accomplishment... [sets] a new standard for the writing of monetary history.

"A lively, enlightening introduction to monetary history…from monetarism's most articulate apostle."—Kirkus Reviews"The Oliver Stone of economics" (Chicago Tribune), Nobel Prize laureate Milton Friedman makes clear once and for all that no one, from the local corner merchant to the Wall Street banker to the president of the United States, is immune from monetary economics. In Money Mischief, Friedman discusses the creation of value: from stones to feathers to gold. He outlines the central role of monetary theory and shows how it can act to ignite or deepen inflation. Through colorful historical episodes, he demonstrates the mischief that can result from a misunderstanding of monetary economics — how, for example, the work of two obscure Scottish chemists destroyed the presidential prospects of William Jennings Bryan and how Franklin D. Roosevelt's decision to appease a few senators from the American West helped communism triumph in China. And he explains, in plain English, what the present monetary system in the United States means for your paycheck and your savings as well as for the global economy.

By the time of Barack Obama's inauguration as the 44th president of the United States, he had already developed an ambitious foreign policy vision. By his own account, he sought to bend the arc of history toward greater justice, freedom, and peace; within a year he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, largely for that promise. In Bending History , Martin Indyk, Kenneth Lieberthal, and Michael O’Hanlon measure Obama not only against the record of his predecessors and the immediate challenges of the day, but also against his own soaring rhetoric and inspiring goals. Bending History assesses the considerable accomplishments as well as the failures and seeks to explain what has happened. Obama's best work has been on major and pressing foreign policy challenges—counterterrorism policy, including the daring raid that eliminated Osama bin Laden; the "reset" with Russia; managing the increasingly significant relationship with China; and handling the rogue states of Iran and North Korea. Policy on resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, however, has reflected serious flaws in both strategy and execution. Afghanistan policy has been plagued by inconsistent messaging and teamwork. On important "softer" security issues—from energy and climate policy to problems in Africa and Mexico—the record is mixed. As for his early aspiration to reshape the international order, according greater roles and responsibilities to rising powers, Obama's efforts have been well-conceived but of limited effectiveness. On issues of secondary importance, Obama has been disciplined in avoiding fruitless disputes (as with Chavez in Venezuela and Castro in Cuba) and insisting that others take the lead (as with Qaddafi in Libya). Notwithstanding several missteps, he has generally managed well the complex challenges of the Arab awakenings, striving to strike the right balance between U.S. values and interests. The authors see Obama's foreign policy to date as a triumph of discipline and realism over ideology. He has been neither the transformative beacon his devotees have wanted, nor the weak apologist for America that his critics allege. They conclude that his grand strategy for promoting American interests in a tumultuous world may only now be emerging, and may yet be curtailed by conflict with Iran. Most of all, they argue that he or his successor will have to embrace U.S. economic renewal as the core foreign policy and national security challenge of the future.