9 results for "Psychology"

Mindblindness: an essay on autism and theory of mind

Baron-Cohen, Simon
In Mindblindness , Simon Baron-Cohen presents a model of the evolution and development of "mindreading." He argues that we mindread all the time, effortlessly, automatically, and mostly unconsciously. It is the natural way in which we interpret, predict, and participate in social behavior and communication. We ascribe mental states to people: states such as thoughts, desires, knowledge, and intentions. Building on many years of research, Baron-Cohen concludes that children with autism, suffer from "mindblindness" as a result of a selective impairment in mindreading. For these children, the world is essentially devoid of mental things. Baron-Cohen develops a theory that draws on data from comparative psychology, from developmental, and from neuropsychology. He argues that specific neurocognitive mechanisms have evolved that allow us to mindread, to make sense of actions, to interpret gazes as meaningful, and to decode "the language of the eyes." A Bradford Book
MIT 1997-01-22 171 pages

What is it like to be a bat?

Nagel, Thomas
"This book is a fiftieth anniversary republication of Thomas Nagel's "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?", a classic in the philosophy of mind. Through its argument for the irreducible subjectivity of consciousness, it played an essential role in making the study of consciousness a central part of philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience. It also spurred the now flourishing scientific attention to the consciousness of non-human creatures: mammals, birds, fish, mollusks, and insects. The book also includes a second essay offering Nagel's more recent thoughts on the most promising positive response to the mind-body problem, as posed in the original essay"--
Oxford University Press 2024 64 pages

The mind doesn't work that way: the scope and limits of computational psychology

Fodor, Jerry A.
In this engaging book, Jerry Fodor argues against the widely held view that mental processes are largely computations, that the architecture of cognition is massively modular, and that the explanation of our innate mental structure is basically Darwinian. Although Fodor has praised the computational theory of mind as the best theory of cognition that we have got, he considers it to be only a fragment of the truth. In fact, he claims, cognitive scientists do not really know much yet about how the mind works (the book's title refers to Steve Pinker's How the Mind Works ). Fodor's primary aim is to explore the relationship among computational and modular theories of mind, nativism, and evolutionary psychology. Along the way, he explains how Chomsky's version of nativism differs from that of the widely received New Synthesis approach. He concludes that although we have no grounds to suppose that most of the mind is modular, we have no idea how nonmodular cognition could work. Thus, according to Fodor, cognitive science has hardly gotten started.
MIT Press 2000 126 pages

Discovering the mind. Vol. 2. Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Buber / with a new introd. by Ivan Soll

Kaufmann, Walter Arnold
In this second volume of a trilogy that represents a landmark contribution to philosophy, psychology, and intellectual history, Walter Kaufmann has selected three seminal figures of the modem period who have radically altered our understanding of what it is to be human. His interpretations of Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Buber are lively, accessible, and penetrating, and in the best scholarly tradition they challenge and revise accepted views.After an introductory chapter on Kierkegaard and Schopenhauer, with particular attention to the former's views on despair and the latter's on insanity and repression, Kaufmann argues that Nietzsche was the first great depth psychologist and shows how he revolutionized human self-understanding. Nietzsche's psychology, including his fascinating psychology of masks, is discussed fully and expertly.Heidegger's version of existentialism is herein subjected to a devastating attack. After criticizing it, Kaufmann shows how the same mentality finds expression in Heidegger's philosophy and in his now-infamous pro-Nazi writings. Here, as in his portraits of other major thinkers, the author's concern is to show that his subjects are of one piece.
Transaction Publ. 1990 308 pages

Concepts: where cognitive science went wrong

Fodor, Jerry A.
Oxford Cognitive Science Series General Editors: Martin Davies, Wilde Reader in Mental Philosophy, University of Oxford, UK, James Higginbotham, Professor of General Linguistics, University of Oxford, UK, John O'Keefe, Professor of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College, London, UK, Christopher Peacocke, Waynflete Professor of Metaphysical Philosophy, University of Oxford, UK, and Kim Plunkett, University Lecturer in Psychology, University of Oxford, UK The Oxford Cognitive Science series is a forum for the best contemporary work in this flourishing field, where various disciplines - cognitive psychology, philosophy, linguistics, cognitive neuroscience, and computational theory - join forces in the investigation of thought, awareness, understanding, and associated workings of the mind. Each book will represent an original contribution to its subject, but will be accessible beyond the ranks of specialists, so as to reach a broad interdisciplinary readership. The serieswill be carefully shaped and steered by the general editors, with the aim of representing the most important developments in the field and bringing together its constituent disciplines. About this book The renowned philosopher Jerry Fodor, who has been a leading figure in the study of the mind for more than twenty years, presents a strikingly original theory of the basic constituents of thought. He suggests that the heart of a cognitive science is its theory of concepts, and that cognitive scientists have gone badly wrong in many areas because their assumptions about concepts have been seriously mistaken. Fodor argues compellingly for an atomistic theory of concepts, deals out witty and pugnacious demolitions of the rival theories that have prevailed in recent years, and suggests that future work on human cognition should build upon new foundations. This lively, conversational, and surprisingly accessible book is the first volume in the Oxford Cognitive Science Series, where the best original work in this field will be presented to a broad readership. Concepts will fascinate anyone interested in contemporary work on mind and language. Cognitive science will never be the same again.
Clarendon Press 1998 174 pages

Hume variations

Fodor, Jerry A.
Hume? Yes, David Hume, that's who Jerry Fodor looks to for help in advancing our understanding of the mind. Fodor claims his Treatise of Human Nature as the foundational document of cognitive science: it launched the project of constructing an empirical psychology on the basis of a representational theory of mind. Going back to this work after more than 250 years we find that Hume is remarkably perceptive about the components and structure that a theory of mind requires. Careful study ofthe Treatise helps us to see what's amiss with much twentieth-century philosophy of mind, and to get on the right track. Hume says in the Treatise that his main project is to construct a theory of human nature and, in particular, a theory of the mind. Hume Variations examines his account of cognition and how it is grounded in his 'theory of ideas'. Fodor discusses such key topics as the distinction between 'simple' and 'complex' ideas, the thesis that an idea is some kind of picture, and theroles that 'association' and 'imagination' play in cognitive processes. He argues that the theory of ideas, as Hume develops it, is both historically and ideologically continuous with the representational theory of mind as it is now widely endorsed by cognitive scientists. This view of Hume is explicitly opposed to recent discussions by critics who hold that the theory of ideas is the Achilles heel of his philosophy and that he would surely have abandoned it if only he had read Wittgenstein carefully. You don't have to know much about Hume to enjoy this inventively argued, provocative, and stimulating defence of the representational theory of mind--which is looking increasingly hard to resist. LINES OF THOUGHT Philosophy books don't need to be hundreds of pages long to make a substantial contribution to the subject. This new series presents original works by leading philosophers at an affordable price and a readable length. Series Editors Peter Ludlow (University of Michigan,Ann Arbor) Scott Sturgeon (Birkbeck College, London)
Oxford University Press 2005 165 pages

An anatomy of thought: the origin and machinery of the mind

Glynn, Ian
One of the human brain’s most remarkable achievements is that it is able to investigate its own working. In An Anatomy of Thought, Ian Glynn takes full advantage of this facility to explain why the nature of consciousness is now much more of a mystery to science than the nature of life. Assuming no specialized knowledge, Glynn demonstrates how it is that nerve cells in our eyes and ears, on our tongues, and on our finger tips (as well as many other places) are able to interact with our nerve cells in our brains to analyse situations, make decisions and remember past events. Drawing deeply on a dazzlingly wide array of disciplines – physiology, neurology, psychology, anthropology, linguistics and philosophy – he explains the nature of seeing, of language and of thought, in the process often telling us not only what is known but also how we have come to know it, and where, precisely, the gaps remain in our knowledge. In his concluding chapters, Glynn provides an account of recent attempts by philosophers to explain the relationship between mind and body, and explains why we possess free will and ethical responsibilities. In its scope and ambition, and in the extraordinary range of the sciences on which it draws, An Anatomy of Thought is indispensable for anyone seeking a truly comprehensive and state-of-the-art understanding of what is still the most complex object in the known universe.
Weidenfeld & Nicolson 1999 456 pages

Keeping Mentally Fit 1928

Jastrow, Joseph
1928. A guide to everyday psychology. This book is based on the belief that there are many ways of meeting the demand for knowledge of the mind's behavior and one of them is to follow the popular habit of the mind. This browses more readily than it studies, wants to be stimulated as well as informed, absorbs willingly what ties up with established interests, and that means practical ones. There are all sorts and conditions of readers; and the psychology of the average reader is considered in this work.
Kessinger Pub Co 2003-05-20 312 pages

Critique of impure reason: an essay on neurons, somatic markers, and consciousness

Munz, Peter
Thanks to the enormous progress of neuroscience over the past few decades, we can now monitor the passage of initial stimulations to certain points in the brain. In spite of these findings, however, subjective consciousness still remains an unsolved mystery. This volume exposes neuroscience and cognitive science to philosophical analysis and proposes that we think of our conscious states of mind as a composite phenomenon consisting of three layers: neuronal events, somatic markers, and explicit consciousness. While physics and chemistry can and have been successfully employed to describe the causal relation between the first two layers, the further step to articulate consciousness is purely interpretative and points to the preponderant importance of language. Language is essential for the transformation of inchoate, not very informative somatic markers and mere moods into full consciousness and appraised emotion. Munz uses literary examples to shift our understanding of the mind away from computational models and to show how eloquence about our states of mind is manufactured rather than caused. He firmly rejects the efforts of both Freud and non-Freudian psychologists to find a scientific explanation for such manufacture and to make a science out of the eloquence of folk psychology. Instead he argues that the many ways eloquence is being manufactured to transform somatic markers into conscious states of mind are best accounted for in terms of Wittgenstein's conception of language games. This volume challenges most current thinking about consciousness and mind and will appeal to philosophers, psychologists, neuroscientists, and linguists.
Praeger 1999-02-28 238 pages