In this startling book, now in paperback, the bestselling author of Explaining Hitler warns that a nuclear World War III is not only the most massive and imminent threat to existence as we know it, but also one of the most ignored. While Russian aggression grows and North Korean nuclear ambitions increase unabated, tensions continue to escalate between India and Pakistan and in the Middle East. Meanwhile, Iran remains committed to developing its nuclear program despite international sanctions. No other writer has assembled the extraordinary array of sources and experiences that Ron Rosenbaum calls on to inform his examination of nuclear war. While working from both historical and contemporary perspectives to explore the people and events that could shape the form of a third world war, he suggests humans have never before been so close to annihilation. In this book, Rosenbaum examines both the paranoia and very real set of possibilities that informs our view of nuclear war and asks whether we can “undream” the nightmare.

Using examples from a wide variety of conflicts, Lawrence Freedman shows that successful military command depends on the ability not only to use armed forces effectively but also to understand the political context in which they are operating. Command in war is about forging effective strategies and implementing them, making sure that orders are appropriate, well-communicated, and then obeyed. But it is also an intensely political process. This is largely because how wars are fought depends to a large extent on how their aims are set. It is also because commanders in one realm must possess the ability to work with other command structures, including those of other branches of the armed forces and allies. In Command, Lawrence Freedman explores the importance of political as well as operational considerations in command with a series of eleven vivid case studies, all taken from the period after 1945. Over this period, the risks of nuclear escalation led to a shift away from great power confrontations and towards civil wars, and advances in communication technologies made it easier for higher-level commanders to direct their subordinates. Freedman covers defeats as well as victories. Pakistani generals tried to avoid surrender as they were losing the eastern part of their country to India in 1971. Iraq's Saddam Hussein turned his defeats into triumphant narratives of victory. Osama bin Laden escaped the Americans in Afghanistan in 2001. The UK struggled as a junior partner to the US in Iraq after 2003. We come across insubordinate generals, such as Israel's Arik Sharon, and those in the French army in Algeria, so frustrated with their political leadership that they twice tried to change it. At the other end of the scale, Che Guevara in Congo in 1966 and Igor Girkin in Ukraine in 2014 both tried to spark local wars to suit their grandiose objectives. Freedman ends the book with a meditation on the future of command in a world that is becoming increasingly reliant on technologies like artificial intelligence. A wide-ranging and insightful history of the changing nature of command in the postwar era, this will stand as a definitive account of a foundational concept in both military affairs and politics.

"A rising China, climate change, terrorism, a nuclear Iran, a turbulent Middle East, and a reckless North Korea present serious challenges to our national security. But the biggest threat to the United States comes not from abroad-but from within. Burgeoning deficit and debt, crumbling infrastructure, second class schools, and an outdated immigration system have resulted in a country less competitive and far more vulnerable than it should be. In Foreign Policy Begins at Home, Council on Foreign Relations President Richard N. Haass describes a twenty-first century in which power is widely diffused. Globalization, revolutionary technologies, and power shifts have created a "nonpolar" world of American primacy but not domination. Still, it is a relatively forgiving world, one with no great power rival. How long this strategic respite will last, though, depends entirely on whether the United States puts its own house in order. Haass outlines a process of Restoration that will ensure the United States has the resources it needs to lead the world, set examples other societies will want to emulate, reduce the country's vulnerability to hostile forces and fickle markets, and discourage would-be adversaries from mounting aggression. Provocative and bold, Foreign Policy Begins at Home lays out a new vision for American Restoration. It will require hard choices, but hard choices are called for. At stake is nothing less than America's future and the character of the coming era of history. "--

Takes a hard look at Hussein as someone who embraced a cruel blend of socialism, fascism and pan-Arab nationalism when young, and later became a coup plotter and a member of the Iraqi equivalent of Hitler's Brown Shirts. His genocidal brutality targeted Iraq's ethnic religious and minorities, particularly the Shiites and Kurds. During Saddam's war on Iran, he ordered artillery barrages of nerve gas and cyanide shells. Shows how Pres. George W. Bush does not intend merely to contain or even disarm Iraq. Instead, he plans to liberate this country and bring democracy to a land that for decades has known only dictatorship. Provides a definitive analysis of the Bush Doctrine and its shaping of a foreign policy that projects American influence on behalf of American interests.

'Truly eye-opening . . . The most accessible and coherent introduction to Chomsky's ideas' Irish TimesThe land of the free. The home of the brave. But what has America achieved in the aim of 'spreading democracy' - except wreak havoc across the globe and establish a reckless foreign policy that serves the interest of few and has endangered all too many?In t[Bokinfo]

The world’s foremost expert on Middle Eastern relations explains Iran’s current nuclear potential and what America can do about it: “Engrossing…If Congress gets a vote on going to war with Iran, let’s hope that this book is on everyone’s reading lists” ( The Economist ). In 2005, Kenneth Pollack’s first book about foreign policy in Iran, The Persian Puzzle , sparked a national conversation, laying out the possible options for nuclear deterrent in Iran. But, despite the attention his solutions received, the world didn’t follow his advice. Now, Iran is even closer to possessing nuclear weapons, and America will have to find a new path forward. In Unthinkable, a New York Times and Economist Best Book of 2013 Pollack explores the intractable American problem with Iran, and Tehran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons capability. With the authority of his years as a CIA analyst and his time as the Director of Persian Gulf Affairs on the National Security Council, Pollack keenly examines the nature of the Iranian threat to American interests and the long-going clash that has led us to this point. Pollack explains and assesses the options for American policymakers: redoubling our efforts at a “carrot-and-stick” approach that combines negotiations and sanctions; aiding the Iranian opposition to bring about a popular form of regime change; an Israeli military strike; the American military option; and containing a nuclear Iran. Ultimately, Pollack argues for an assertive version of containment to maintain pressure on Tehran and minimize its ability to contribute to the problems of the Middle East by keeping it largely on the defensive. “Learned, lucid, and deeply sobering” ( Kirkus Reviews ), Pollack has written one of the most important books on foreign policy in this decade.

An inside account of the events unfolding in the Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev. In a series of interviews, 14 leaders of Gorbachev's reforms talk about their personal and political struggles to change the Soviet Union.

The Military History of the Soviet Union and The Military History of Tsarist Russia treat Russian military history from the rise of the Muscovite state to the present, even peeking briefly into the future. The two volumes will cover Russia's land forces extensively, but will also cover the development of the Russian Navy, and the creation and development of the Russian Air Force, parts of the Russian military machine which are frequently neglected in general writings. The historical analysis will address the development and function of the Russian military whether in peace or in war, as well as the impact of war and changes in the military upon Russian society and politics.

A firsthand account of how the Bush administration mismanaged its Afghan campaign, A Vulcan's Tale shines new and important light on the events and people behind the headlines in the immediate years following the September 11 attacks. The "Vulcans," so named by Condoleezza Rice, were eight foreign policy experts who advised George W. Bush during his 2000 presidential campaign. After Bush assumed the presidency, the Vulcans helped shape the administration’s foreign policy following 9/11, including the military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. All were veterans of past administrations, having served under either Ronald Reagan or George H. W. Bush, and they included among their ranks Dov Zakheim. Made comptroller and chief financial officer for the Department of Defense in 2001, Zakheim was also named the DoD’s coordinator for Afghan civilian reconstruction in 2002. In A Vulcan's Tale , Zakheim draws on his own participation and intimate knowledge to analyze how the United States missed critical opportunities while it struggled to manage two wars, particularly the seemingly endless endeavor in Afghanistan. In his view, the Bush administration's disappointing results in Afghanistan were partly attributable to the enormity of the challenges, certainly. But flawed leadership and deficiencies of management, understanding, and forethought all played their parts as well. The power of the purse proved to be especially damaging. The Office of Management and Budget was slow to fund Defense's efforts at the outset of the Afghan conflict and then inadequately funded the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development, casting the die for several additional years of conflict. The invasion of Iraq siphoned off critical resources for Afghanistan, thereby further complicating that country's reconstruction. Even with public policy of the highest order, the devil still lurked in the details, as the DoD's "money man" was soon to discover while he struggled to fund and manage the reconstruction of civilian Afghanistan. A Vulcan's Tale is an authoritative, candid but fair account of how a wise and admirable goal can be waylaid by insufficient funding and ineffective coordination, with the result of faulty—or, at best, incomplete—implementation.

The historic June 2000 North-South summit spawned new hopes for the future of Korea. The prospect of winding down a half-century of confrontation on the Korean peninsula seemed within the realm of possibility. north Korea's secretive leader Kim Jong Il suddenly emerged as a public figure and Pyongang rapidly established diplomatic ties with a host of America's friends in Europe and Asia. Yet as the months have passed, even if Korea has turned a page in its history, none of the basic issues of the Korea question have been resolved. A new administration in Washington faces a new set of challenges in Korea with profound implications for U.S. interests in East Asia. Tensions remain lower than at any time in recent memory, but the demilitarized zone separating North from South Korea remains the most heavily armed border on earth. North-South relations face an uncertain future, and few signs of real change inside North Korea are evident. There is growing uncertainty surrounding the direction of inter-Korean relations, the prospects for dealing with North Korea, and the likelihood for reform in Pyongyang. The task force, co-chaired by Morton I. Abramowitz and James T. Laney, argues that diplomatic gains in recent years are not irreversible. Successful implementation of the Agreed Framework between the United States and North Korea, which froze Pyongyang's known nuclear program in exchange for two light-water reactors and other economic benefits, faces considerable challenges inherited by the Bush administration. Despite eleventh-hour talks on North Korea's ballistic missile program in the waning weeks of the Clinton administration, it remains largely unconstrained. The conventional armsstandoff at the 38th parallel also continues unabated. Verification, too, persists as a key problem facing both the nuclear and missile issues.

Gabriel Kolko provides a panoramic overview of the problems facing the US and the world today. Each chapter covers a key topic, spanning a range of international issues including the current financial crisis, the limits of US foreign policy, the politicisation of intelligence, and why a war with Iran would be likely to culminate in disaster for the US. Kolko also outlines why changes in military technology make all wars, no matter who fights them, increasingly futile. At the heart of the book is the idea that the international system is in the grip of a great transition. Kolko shows how America is losing its dominance, and examines the profound changes we are experiencing as it is forced to accept the limits of its military power.

By a vote of 61 to 38, the Senate joined the House in declaring that "Congress approves...the North American Free Trade Agreement." The vote was virtually unnoticed, since the real battle over NAFTA was in the House. But there is a puzzle here. The President, the Framers assure us, "shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur." Whatever happened to the Treaty Clause? Bruce Ackerman and David Golove tell the story of the Treaty Clause's being displaced in the twentieth century by a modern procedure in which the House of Representatives joins the Senate in the process of consideration, but simple majorities in both Houses suffice to commit the nation. This is called the Congressional-Executive Agreement, and is a response to a sea change in public opinion during and after World War II. This agreement substituted for a failed constitutional amendment that would have required all treaties to be approved by majorities in both Houses rather than by two-thirds of the Senate. The modern Congressional-Executive Agreement was self-consciously developed in order to make formal constitutional amendment unnecessary. So, is NAFTA constitutional? This book is reprinted from the Harvard Law Review .

In an era of democratization and globalization, the number of decision makers has multiplied exponentially. Parliamentarians, bureaucrats, international secretariats, regional governors, and nongovernmental organizations have all gained influence at the expense of heads of state. How do these competing layers of authority bargain with each other to govern? International relations theorists have traditionally focused on how leaders' domestic constraints affect their bargaining position internationally. However, there has been much less work on the flip side of this question--how foreign policy leaders can use international institutions as a means of circumventing or co-opting domestic opposition. Locating the Proper Authorities offers some preliminary answers, drawn from a number of theoretical perspectives by the contributors to this volume. Written by some of the most promising theorists in the field of international relations, the essays in Locating the Proper Authorities address a broad array of substantive issue areas, including humanitarian intervention, trade dispute settlement, economic development, democratic transition, and security cooperation. This broad case selection has the virtue of incorporating developing countries, which are too often ignored in international relations, as well as less well-known international organizations. Each chapter examines the mechanisms and strategies through which policy entrepreneurs use international organizations as a means of bypassing or overcoming opposition to policy change. By examining the effects of different institutional design features, Locating the Proper Authorities helps us understand the variety of influence mechanisms through which international institutions shape the interaction of policy initiators and ratifiers. Daniel W. Drezner is Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Chicago.

First published in 1975, Prophets on the Right examines the views of five conservative critics of American foreign policy from the 1930s to the Cold War era. This new edition contains an introduction in which the author explains how his recent political reorientation, from left to right, has affected his interpretation of the views of the "prophets."