This text discusses Machiavelli, Maurice of Nassau, Gustavus Adolphus, Raimondo Montecuccoli, Vauban, Frederick the Great, Guibert, Bulow, Napoleon, Jomini, Clausewitz, Adam Smith, Alexander Hamilton, Friedrich List, Engels, Marx, Moltke, Schlieffen, Delbruck, Bugeaud, Gallieni, Lyautey, Alfred Thayer Mahan, Liddell Hart, De Gaulle, and other military strategists.

Why do competent armies fail? Eliot Cohen and John Gooch explore answers to this question throughout this extensive analysis of unsuccessful military operations. Since it was first published in 1990, Military Misfortunes has become the classic analysis of the unexpected catastrophes that befall competent militaries. Now with a new Afterword discussing America's missteps in Iraq, Somalia, and the War on Terror, Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch's gripping battlefield narratives and groundbreaking explanations of the hidden factors that undermine armies are brought thoroughly up to date. As recent events prove, Military Misfortunes will be required reading for as long as armies go to war.

In this book, the distinguished writer Edward N. Luttwak presents the grand strategy of the eastern Roman empire we know as Byzantine, which lasted more than twice as long as the more familiar western Roman empire, eight hundred years by the shortest definition. This extraordinary endurance is all the more remarkable because the Byzantine empire was favored neither by geography nor by military preponderance. Yet it was the western empire that dissolved during the fifth century. The Byzantine empire so greatly outlasted its western counterpart because its rulers were able to adapt strategically to diminished circumstances, by devising new ways of coping with successive enemies. It relied less on military strength and more on persuasion—to recruit allies, dissuade threatening neighbors, and manipulate potential enemies into attacking one another instead. Even when the Byzantines fought—which they often did with great skill—they were less inclined to destroy their enemies than to contain them, for they were aware that today’s enemies could be tomorrow’s allies. Born in the fifth century when the formidable threat of Attila’s Huns were deflected with a minimum of force, Byzantine strategy continued to be refined over the centuries, incidentally leaving for us several fascinating guidebooks to statecraft and war. The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire is a broad, interpretive account of Byzantine strategy, intelligence, and diplomacy over the course of eight centuries that will appeal to scholars, classicists, military history buffs, and professional soldiers.

A monumental, groundbreaking work of history that shows how technological and strategic revolutions have transformed the battlefield—from the Spanish Armada to the War on Terror— and how mastery of these innovations has shaped the rise and fall of nations and empires In War Made New , acclaimed author Max Boot explores how innovations in warfare mark crucial turning points in modern history, influencing events well beyond the realm of combat. Combining gripping narrative history with wide-ranging analysis, Boot focuses on four “revolutions” in military affairs and describes key battles from each period to explain how inventions ranging from gunpowder to GPS-guided air-strikes have remade the field of battle— and shaped the rise and fall of empires. Bringing to life battles from the defeat of the Spanish Armada to Wellington’s victory at Assaye, War Made New analyzes the Gunpowder Revolution and explains warfare’s evolution from ritualistic, drawn-out engagements to much deadlier events, precipitating the rise of the modern nation state. He next explores the triumph of steel and steam during the Industrial Revolution, including the British triumph at Omdurman and the climax of the Russo-Japanese war at Tsushima, showing how it powered the spread of European colonial empires. Moving into the twentieth century and the Second Industrial Revolution, Boot examines three critical clashes of World War II—the German army’s blitzkrieg, Pearl Harbor, and the firebombing of Tokyo—to illustrate how new technology such as the tank, radio, and airplane ushered in terrifying new forms of warfare that aided the rise of highly centralized, and even totalitarian, world powers. Finally, in his section on the Information Revolution, Boot focuses on the Gulf War, the invasion of Afghanistan, and the Iraq war, arguing that even as cutting-edge technologies such as stealth aircraft have made America the greatest military power in world history, advanced communications systems have allowed decentralized, “irregular” forces to become an increasingly significant threat to Western power. BACKCOVER: Advance Praise for War Made New “Max Boot traces the impact of military revolutions on the course of politics and history over the past 500 years. In doing so, he shows that changes in military technology are limited not to warfighting alone, but play a decisive role in shaping our world. Sweeping and erudite, while entirely accessible to the lay reader, this work is key for anyone interested in where military revolutions have taken us—and where they might lead in the future.” —U.S. Senator John McCain “While much has been in written in recent years about the so-called ‘Revolution in Military Affairs,’ Max Boot is the first scholar to place it within the broad sweep of history, and in the context of the rise of the West in world affairs since 1500. In so doing, he not only tells a remarkable tale, but he compels us all, even those obsessed solely with contemporary military affairs, to ask the right questions and to distinguish what is truly new and revolutionary from what is merely ephemeral. He has rendered a valuable service, and given us a fascinating read at the same time, so we are doubly in his debt.” —Paul Kennedy, Professor of History at Yale University and author of The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers “ War Made New is impressive in scope. What is equally impressive is its unique interpretation of the causal relationship between technology, warfare and the contemporary social milieu. This is a superb thinking person's book which scrutinizes conventional historical wisdom through a new lens.” —Lt. Gen. Bernard E. Trainor, USMC (ret.), co-author of Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq “Max Boot's book takes hundred of years of tactical battle history and reduces it to an incisive narrative of how war has changed. By providing such a coherent view of the past, he has pointed us toward the future. What is doubly impressive is how he draws surprising, fresh lessons from wars we thought we knew so much about but in fact didn't.” —Robert D. Kaplan, author of Imperial Grunts

Armies of Sand asks, 'why have Arab militaries fought so poorly in the modern era?' It examines the performance of over two-dozen Arab militaries from 1948 to 2017, and compares them to a half-dozen non-Arab militaries, to conclude that politics, economics, and culture all contributed to the past weakness of Arab armies.

Why did Napoleon succeed in 1805 by fail in 1812? Were the railways vital to Prussia's victory over France in 1870? Was the famous Schlieffen Plan militarily sound? Could the European half of World War II have been ended in 1944? These are only a few of the questions that form the subject matter of this meticulously researched, lively book. Drawing on a very wide range of unpublished and previously unexploited sources, Martin van Creveld examines the 'nuts and bolts' of war: namely, those formidable problems of movement and supply, transportation and administration, so often mentioned - but rarely explored - by the vast majority of books on military history. In doing so, he casts his net far and wide, from Gustavus Adolphus to Rommel, from Marlborough to Patton, subjecting the operations of each to a thorough analysis from a fresh and unusual point a view. The result is a fascinating book that has something new to say about virtually every one of the most important campaign waged in Europe during the past two centuries. Moreover, by concentrating on logistics rather than on the more traditional tactics and strategy, Dr van Creveld is able to offer a reinterpretation of the whole field of military history.

In this edition, first published in 1983, the late Professor Raymond Aron, one of France's most distinguished social scientists, presented a major re-evaluation of Carl von Clausewitz, 'the genius of war'. He sees in Clausewitz a political philosopher of major importance, whose impact and significance permeate many facets of modern society.

The theme of Michael Howard's stimulating book is expressed in the following quote: "Wars have often determined the character of society. Society in exchange has determined the character of wars." Written with all the author's usual skill, Howard surveys a thousand years of history, and draws a broad outline of developments which will delight the general reader.

First published over thirty years ago, War in European History is a brilliantly written survey of the changing ways that war has been waged in Europe, from the Norse invasions to the present day. Far more than a simple military history, the book serves as a succinct and enlightening overview of the development of European society as a whole over the last millennium. From the Norsemen and the world of the medieval knights, through to the industrialized mass warfare of the twentieth century, Michael Howard illuminates the way in which warfare has shaped the history of the Continent, its effect on social and political institutions, and the ways in which technological and social change have in turn shaped the way in which wars are fought. This new edition includes a fully updated further reading and a new final chapter bringing the story into the twenty-first century, including the invasion of Iraq and the so-called "War against Terror."

"Why is Israel's relatively small and low-budget military also the world's most innovative, technologically and logistically? Edward Luttwak and Eitan Shamir look to the IDF's unique structure: integrating army, air force, and navy in one service, under an officer class constantly refreshed by short tenures, the IDF is built for agility and change"--

Renaissance military memoirs studied for what they reveal of contemporary attiudes towards war, selfhood and identity.

An account by the US Army commander who oversaw operations in Kosovo in 1999, offering a look at military decision making in real time and exposing the nature of the conflicts within the Atlantic Alliance and within the US government. 8pp b&w plates

From Confucian China to the present day, warriors have understood that combat is an art, one requiring sharp, flexible minds capable of adapting quickly to constantly shifting situations. In a survey that looks widely across history and cultures, the theories of some of the finest thinkers and strategists unfold, illuminating the development of military thought. The story begins with ancient Chinese tacticians, especially Sun Tzu, who was among the first to compose written texts on how to wage war. It then proceeds to the age of classical antiquity, which saw the creation of many unsurpassed works on military history: to Byzantine and medieval Western thought; to the years between 1500 and the end of the Seven Years' War, when Machiavelli wrote; and then to some of the true greats like Clausewitz. We head into the modern age with a look at the 19th century, naval warfare, the two World Wars, nuclear strategy, and guerrilla insurrections. 224 pages, 70 color illus., 80 b/w illus., 7 3/4 x 10 3/8.

"War is the most important thing in the world', writes Martin van Creveld, one of the world's best-known experts on military history and strategy. The survival of every country, government, and individual is ultimately dependent on war - or the ability to wage it in self-defence. That is why, though it may come but once in a hundred years, it must be prepared for every day. When it is too late - when the bodies lie stiff and people weep over them - those in charge have failed in their duty. Nevertheless, in spite of the centrality of war to human history and culture, there has for long been no modern attempt to provide a replacement for the classics on war and strategy, Sun Tzu's The Art of War, dating from the 5th or 6th century BC, and Carl von Clausewitz's On War, written in the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars. What is needed is a modern, comprehensive, easy to read and understand theory of war for the 21st century that could serve as a replacement for these classic texts. The purpose of the present book is to provide just such a theory.--Book flap

"Men of Bronze takes up one of the most important and fiercely debated subjects in ancient history and classics: how did archaic Greek hoplites fight, and what role, if any, did hoplite warfare play in shaping the Greek polis? In the nineteenth century, George Grote argued that the phalanx battle formation of the hoplite farmer citizen-soldier was the driving force behind a revolution in Greek social, political, and cultural institutions. Throughout the twentieth century scholars developed and refined this grand hoplite narrative with the help of archaeology. But over the past thirty years other scholars have criticized nearly every major tenet of this orthodoxy. Indeed, these revisionists have persuaded many specialists that the evidence demands a new interpretation of the hoplite narrative and a rewriting of early Greek history. Men of Bronze gathers leading scholars to advance the current debate and bring it to a broader audience of ancient historians, classicists, archaeologists, and general readers. After explaining the historical context and significance of the hoplite question, the book assesses and pushes forward the debate over the traditional hoplite narrative and demonstrates why it is at a crucial turning point. Instead of reaching a consensus, the contributors have sharpened their differences, providing new evidence, explanations, and theories about the origin, nature, strategy, and tactics of the hoplite phalanx and its effect on Greek culture and the rise of the polis."

This is a 1976 study of the organization and tactics of the Seleucid armies from 312 to 129 BC. The first part of the book discusses the numerical strength of the armies, their sources of manpower, the contingents of the regular army, their equipment and historical development, the chain of command, training and discipline. The second part reconstructs the great campaigns in order to examine the Seleucid tactics. The book provides a lesson in Hellenistic and military history and discusses several questions: how did the Hellenistic armies develop after Alexander? What distinguished the Seleucid army as superior to its Hellenistic contemporaries? The answers illuminate the expansion of Hellenism as we learn how the Seleucid army was used as a military, social and cultural instrument to impose the rule of the dynasty over the vast regions of the Empire and how it helped to shape Hellenistic society in the East.

Without the complex military machine that his forebears had built up over the course of the eighth century, it would have been impossible for Charlemagne to revive the Roman empire in the West. Early Carolingian Warfare is the first book-length study of how the Frankish dynasty, beginning with Pippin II, established its power and cultivated its military expertise in order to reestablish the regnum Francorum , a geographical area of the late Roman period that includes much of present-day France and western Germany. Bernard Bachrach has thoroughly examined contemporary sources, including court chronicles, military handbooks, and late Roman histories and manuals, to establish how the early Carolingians used their legacy of political and military techniques and strategies forged in imperial Rome to regain control in the West. Pippin II and his successors were not diverted by opportunities for financial enrichment in the short term through raids and campaigns outside of the regnum Francorum; they focused on conquest with sagacious sensibilities, preferring bloodless diplomatic solutions to unnecessarily destructive warfare, and disdained military glory for its own sake. But when they had to deploy their military forces, their operations were brutal and efficient. Their training was exceptionally well developed, and their techniques included hand-to-hand combat, regimented troop movements, fighting on horseback with specialized mounted soldiers, and the execution of lengthy sieges employing artillery. In order to sustain their long-term strategy, the early Carolingians relied on a late Roman model whereby soldiers were recruited from among the militarized population who were required by law to serve outside their immediate communities. The ability to mass and train large armies from among farmers and urban-dwellers gave the Carolingians the necessary power to lay siege to the old Roman fortress cities that dominated the military topography of the West. Bachrach includes fresh accounts of Charles Martel's defeat of the Muslims at Poitiers in 732, and Pippin's successful siege of Bourges in 762, demonstrating that in the matter of warfare there never was a western European Dark Age that ultimately was enlightened by some later Renaissance. The early Carolingians built upon surviving military institutions, adopted late antique technology, and effectively utilized their classical intellectual inheritance to prepare the way militarily for Charlemagne's empire.

First Edition. Some wear. Some tanning and spot to front DJ. Tiny spots to page edges. Pages are clean and binding is tight.

Throughout the history of Western civilization, war, preparation for war, and its aftermath have dominated the use of surplus human and material resources. Yet, despite our recent history, the brute facts of military history are too often ignored by those who have instead sought to provide a more ideal understanding of the Middle Ages in Europe. This predilection for chivalry at the expense of logistics and for "just war theory" at the expense of military technology have distorted both scholarly and popular understanding of the role played by military matters in the Middle Ages. The aim of the fourteen articles reprinted here is to help provide a more balanced view, offsetting notions of romanticism and an anthropologically inspired primitivism of a Dark Age in pre-Crusade Europe. Particular topics include: the survival of Classical influences into the early Middle Ages; the strategy of castle-building in the early Angevin domains; and William the Conqueror's preparations for the invasion of England.