The starting point of this book is the coexistence of the overlapping regimes of the WTO, the EU and the NAFTA. On this basis it explores the emergence of a nascent Common Law of International Trade. This exploration is rooted in three phenomena: Firstly, the fact that the very same regulatory measure may come simultaneously within the jurisdictional reach of more than one trade regime and may even be adjudicated simultaneously. Some regimes offer alternatives. The NAFTA, for example, offers GATT dispute resolution as an option for many of its own disputes. Secondly, convergence in the material law of the disparate international trade regimes. This, of course, is the heart of the emergent Common Law. Thirdly, the strengthening of private parties in all regimes. Once a preserve of the EU, the NAFTA allows private party dispute resolution of different types in relation to various matters and in the case of the WTO, although it is still an intergovernmental preserve,private actors are learning to manipulate the system. This volume, built on a recent series of courses at the Academy of European Law, is a reflection of this conviction. The various contributions deal with discrete areas - in the double sense - of the international trading system but each placing considerable emphasis on the interlocking nature of the various components of that system. It is our conviction that this is the appropriate way to understand and to teach this branch of the law.

This 2004 book aims at advancing our understanding of the influences international norms and international institutions have over the incentives of states to cooperate on issues such as environment and trade. Contributors adopt two different approaches in examining this question. One approach focuses on the constitutive elements of the international legal order, including customary international law, soft law and framework conventions, and on the types of incentives states have, such as domestic incentives and reputation. The other approach examines specific issues in the areas of international environment protection and international trade. The combined outcome of these two approaches is an understanding of the forces that pull states toward closer cooperation or prevent them from doing so, and the impact of different types of international norms and diverse institutions on the motivation of states. The insights gained suggest ways for enhancing states' incentives to cooperate through the design of norms and institutions.